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The post-independence Mocambican civil service, what was left of it following the
exodus of Portuguese settlers in the mid-1970s, was poorly educated, with low
incentives. In subsequent years, the combination of a war-ravaged economy, poor
human resources and mass poverty made it difficult for the state to redress the harsh
colonial legacy by improving access to social services, notably education and
healthcare.
In 1987, the government embarked on structural adjustment reforms in a bid to create
the macroeconomic conditions for growth. However, to meet the government's stated
goal of poverty reduction demands more efficient institutional machinery, not only at
the state level but also in the countryside. This study is an attempt to put in perspective
the role of the state, notably the civil service, in the new dispensation in the country.
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1 Introduction
Mozambique, like many other Sub-Saharan African countries has undertaken far-
reaching political and economic reforms in recent years with the goal of generating
rapid but sustainable economic growth and improving the efficiency of public
administration, notably in the delivery of social services and in combating poverty.
However, while many African countries have experienced serious difficulties in
implementing these reforms, notably due to poor implementation and inadequate
incentives for those employed in the civil service, Mozambique’s experience has been
aggravated by a number of extenuating socio-economic circumstances, with poverty and
poor human resource endowments much more severe than in other countries (see also
Table 1).
As noted in a UNDP document authored by Massingue, Muchanga and Labelle (1995),
the process of change in the country has involved several transitions: from a situation of
war to that of peace, reconstruction and resettlement; from Marxist-Leninism towards
political pluralism; from a planned to a market oriented economy and from centralised
economic and political structures to decentralised ones, emphasising popular
participation. The country achieved its independence in 1975 after a long-lived war of
independence which, commencing in 1964, had decimated social and economic
infrastructure. The victory of Frelimo, a party of freedom fighters, saw the departure of
over 200,000 Portuguese settlers who had comprised the bulk of the civil service as well
the top echelons of the modern sector.
As one of the “frontline states” against the apartheid regime in South Africa,
Mozambique was the target of considerable external aggression. A civil war broke out
in the 1980s, with government forces pitied against those of Renamo, a guerrilla force
with considerable support from the central regions of the country. The war led to the
destruction of physical capital, rising defence expenditures and to sharp declines in
social outlays (Brück, 2000). Above all it created uncertainty, which affected resource
allocation decisions of the households as well as the government. The civil service
lacked resources both financial and human to enable it do its work properly, while the
provincial administrations were weakened considerably as well. It was not until after
protracted negotiations brokered by several groups and supported by the United Nations
that the civil war was ended and multiparty elections declared in October 1994 (see
Alden, 2000).
In the rapidly changing regional and international conditions, the government has been
forced to redefine Mozambique’s place in regional and global terms. Foremost in this
regard was the need to adjust to the sudden decline of the Soviet Union, a major
economic partner and supplier of military equipment. It has, however, also been
important to respond to the changing political configuration in Southern Africa itself,
especially following the achievement of majority rule in South Africa and the search for
greater economic collaboration, aside from the traditional one of the export of
Mozambican labour to the South African mines. In political and economic terms,
policymakers in Mozambique have had to adopt a more pragmatic approach, including
adoption of multiparty politics, market-based economic reforms, and the unprecedented
incorporation of the country into the Commonwealth, otherwise a grouping of former
British colonies.2
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Rural 71.2 72.2 85.1 1.0 160.2
Urban 62.0 33.3 46.2 31.0 101.2
National 69.4 60.5 74.1 8.5 145.7
Sub-Saharan
Africa
- 39.0 72.5 43 92
Source: Republic of Mozambique (2000a)
Responding to these challenges has not been altogether easy. The Mozambican civil
service, what was left of it after the exodus of Portuguese settlers in the mid-1970s, was
poorly educated with low incentives. The style of management was based on the East
European model of central control, but without the human resources and technical
expertise to make a success of it. Moreover, the duplication of central functions at the
regional level, in a bid to decentralise power, only led to poor co-ordination and
ineffective use of resources. The role of the state in the new economic dispensation is
still a matter for strong debate in Mozambique. The country suffers from chronic
poverty and a paucity of human capital, while the effects of the long-lived civil war still
seriously affect social and economic conditions in many parts of the country (Bowen,
1992, Kyle, 1991).
The combination of a war-ravaged economy, poor human capacities, and rampant
poverty, has also made the country extremely debt laden and aid-dependent. Since the
adoption of the Economic Rehabilitation Programme in 1987, which was changed to
Economic and Social Rehabilitation Programme in 1990 to emphasise social sectors and
human development, Mozambican policymakers have sought to implement a well-
coordinated reform programme with support from bilateral donors as well as the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The programme focused on the following:
the promotion of private investment; liberalisation of prices; privatisation of state
owned enterprises; improvement of fiscal policy, by reducing tax exemptions, reducing
the tax rate and lowering the budget deficit; reforming the financial sector; reforming
the foreign exchange market, by letting the exchange rate to be determined freely in the
market (see also Republic of Mozambique, 2000b).
The programme has had an appreciable impact. Inflation was for instance reduced from
147 per cent in 1987 to an estimated 4 per cent a decade later. The rate of growth was,
on average, above 6 per cent in the 1990s. Thus aside from the external shocks, such as
the floods of 2000 as well as some long drought spells, the reforms had helped bring the
Mozambican economy back onto the road to sustainable growth.
But even after a decade of reasonable growth, Mozambique remains a very poor country
with overwhelming development needs. A substantial portion of its population remains3
displaced or cannot return to its homes due to the threat of mines or other security
hazards. The rural sector still lacks basic infrastructure, including amenities such as
primary schools, health centres, good quality roads and food storage facilities. In a
consultative group meeting in Paris in 1995, the government reiterated its policies as
follows: To strengthen governance at all levels; normalise life in the countryside;
develop human resources; increase economic growth; and reduce macroeconomic
imbalances in the context of growth (see Tarp and Lau, 1996, Danida, 1996). By the end
of the 1990s, the government had recorded a number of achievements in its reform
efforts, including the development of a medium-term expenditure framework, revision
of the civil service career and compensation systems, a reduction and rationalisation of
direct tax rates and the introduction of a value added tax (VAT). Further, an ambitious
privatisation programme had seen the sale of the bulk of the state owned enterprises,
while the trade regime had been simplified, with import and export taxes reduced.
The government’s medium-term objectives, as expressed in its “Letter of Intent” to the
International Monetary Fund for the year 2000, are based on sustaining these
achievements with the goal of poverty reduction via high and sustainable growth,
reduction of regional inequalities and the consolidation of peace and national unity (see
for example Republic of Mozambique, 2000a). The achievement of these objectives
depends on the efficiency of the public sector. The government has thus embarked on
plans to review the machinery of government with a view to raising the quality of
governance, including public sector accountability. In the medium term, the government
will also seek to adhere to the terms of the HIPC (Heavily indebted poor countries)
completion point, which include devising specific strategies for combating poverty and
in this context the preparation of a poverty reduction strategy paper (IMF and IDA,
2000).
The main purpose of this paper is to study the process of institutional reform and
transformation in Mozambique during a period characterised not only by social
economic crisis and civil war but also more recently by economic liberalisation and a
return to peace and growth. The focus of our discussion will be on the civil service. The
presentation is threefold: First, we provide an overview of the state of the Mozambican
civil service and how it has changed during and through the crisis, the economic
reforms launched in 1987, as well as after the return of peace. Second, we look
especially at the incentive structure in the civil service and assess how the various
reforms, such as privatisation, have impacted on wages and employment in the public
sector as a whole. Third, we analyse how the changes in the civil service have affected
the delivery of social services in general, with particular focus on health and education.
Our discussion of the access to social services will also touch on the situation at the
regional levels, where poor incentives and remoteness from the centre have affected the
quality and quantity of the services available.
2 The Mozambican civil service in transition
At independence in 1975, the Mozambican civil service had very limited capacity for
implementing government directives and policies, this being especially marked at the
provincial and district levels. The country’s most acute shortcoming was lack of
educated manpower (Nkomo, 1986). For example, owing to the very little attention paid
to African education during colonial rule, only about 40 Mozambicans had acquired a4
university degree at the time of independence in 1975. It is estimated that in the mid-
1990s close to 67 per cent of the population was illiterate, with women comprising
about 77 per cent of this.
From 1975, the government had sought to pursue economic development along the
socialist principles of a planned economy that were espoused by Frelimo, the ruling
party, and by neighbouring countries such as Tanzania. However, the government’s
support of liberalisation movements in Southern Africa led, as a counter move from the
minority-led governments of the region, to the creation of Renamo, a long-lived rebel
group supported in the first instance by Rhodesia, and after the latter’s independence in
1980, by South Africa. The civil war came to disrupt all social and economic activities
in Mozambique, especially the central and northern districts. The resources meant for
the civil service were seriously circumscribed, as indeed the government’s ability to
deliver social services. By the early 1980s, the government had been forced to abandon
its control stance and to embark on a long process of economic and political re-
orientation. This would see it adopt structural adjustment policies funded by donors and
the multilateral agencies and embrace a credible multiparty system of government,
following the signing of a cease fire between the Frelimo led government and Renamo
in 1992.
The economic and political crisis in Mozambique meant that the government was not
able to formulate policies to make the civil service, both at the center and in the
provinces, more efficient. In the public sector, policies were more determined by short-
term fiscal concerns than by those of capacity building, the improvement of job
incentives and the efficient delivery of social services.
The paucity of skilled labour in Mozambique has been compensated for somewhat by
the presence of a large expatriate community, mainly financed by international aid
programs. It is estimated that in 1990, as the country proceeded with its reforms, but
before the end to the civil war, around 5000 expatriates were employed in Mozambique
(World Bank, 1991). Thus the country has become doubly dependent: on the one hand
on the financing from donors and on the other on advice given by the donor-funded
expatriates. While aid coordination remains the government’s responsibility, a serious
lack of human resources has implied that in effect aid policy remains fragmented and
subject to the whim of individual donors (Wuyts, 1995).
On the demand side, a number of factors have contributed to the rapid expansion of the
market for skilled labor. The liberalization and return of peace have led to the revival of
the private, as investments from abroad, notably neighboring South Africa have began
to pour in. Some foreign investment projects, such as the aluminum smelter Mozal have
increased the demand for technicians and engineers, with a very positive impact on their
wages. The financial sector, for long under state controls, has also seen considerable
expansion. It now comprises more than 10 commercial banks as well as insurance
companies.
As a result of the skilled labor shortage, the wage gap between the private and public
sectors had reached absurdly large levels by the end of the 1990s. For example, drivers
in the private sector or in international organization earned the equivalent of a lecturer’s
salary at the government owned Eduardo Mondlane University. Still, this was an
improvement from the early 1990s, when pay differentials between the same categories
in the private and public sectors were tenfold (World Bank, 1991). Then a janitor5
employed by an international organization earned a salary that was equivalent to that of
a director in the public sector. However, since in actual fact directors in government
departments had a visibly higher standard of living than janitors in the private sector,
the skewed incentive structure had led to moonlighting by senior civil servants,
including the “privatisation” of public services, in attempts to maintain standards. The
taking of bribes, absenteeism as well as outright theft of public property became the
means by which public sector workers compensated themselves for the low wages.* In
the more remote provinces, whether scope for parallel activities was limited, public
officials absconded from duty altogether.
Thus while public administration and the government’s own projects were seriously
affected by loss of manpower to the private sector, to projects initiated by the donor
community and to the many non-governmental organizations (NGOs), shortage of
managerial and professional competencies in the government itself disrupted public
sector activities. Economic programs have been slow in implementation, while the
regulatory weaknesses of the central agencies have affected the pace at which the
private sector can expand its activities.
As in other African countries that have experienced prolonged civil strife, the size of the
civil service in Mozambique is not known for certain. According to the 1980 Census,
employment in public administration corresponded to about 2 of the labor force that is
about 110,000 workers. However, a census of civil servants conducted by the Ministry
of State Administration during 1989/1990, and reconciled with the payroll census
undertaken by the Ministry of Finance, estimated the number of civil servants to be
105,000, indicating a modest reduction in public employment during the decade when
the country saw an escalation in civil strife (World Bank, 1991). By 2000, however, the
number of civil servants had increased to 121,562 indicating a growth of about 16 per
cent over the decade (see Table 2).
Table 2 indicates that while the number of civil servants was growing at about 1.6 per
cent per year over the 1990s, some districts enjoyed much more rapid growth than
others. The province around the capital, Maputo Provincia, as well as the capital itself
saw large increases in the number of civil servants employed in their administrations.
On the other hand, remoter regions saw much smaller increases in the number of civil
servants, certainly, as in the case of Nampula and Zambezia, not matching their huge
shares of the total population. In Cabo Delgado, the number of civil servants decreased
by 24 per cent and that in Inhambane by 2.5 per cent. Since the number of civil servants
proxies the level of service provision, sharp declines reflect retrenchment in service
provision as well as reduction in the income effects associated to civil service
employment. The remoter regions thus experienced appreciable negative impacts on
local welfare.
* In an interview with Courier magazine (No. 168, March-April, 1998), a Mozambican minister referred
to this as “secondary remuneration”.6
Table 2
Distribution of mozambican civil servants in 2000 by province, health and
education sectors (comparison to 1990 (in brackets) and shares of population)
















Niassa 5 7,164 (5.9) 19.0 11.6 (23.7) 51.7 (46.5)
Cabo
Delgado
8.5 7,598 (6.2) -24.0 14.5 (16.6) 50.2 (66.5)
Nampula 18.9 15,776 (13) 17.0 13.6 (20.7) 57.0 (64.0)
Zambezia 19.2 12,828 (10.5) 18.0 12.9 (23.0) 68.0 (61.0)
Tete 7.6 8,076 (6.6) 12.6 15.5 (27.8) 57.2 (49.3)
Manica 6.6 7,094 (5.8) 20.3 14.5 (24.8) 55.5 (51.0)
Sofala 8.4 10,061 (8.3) 5.7 19.0 (32.0) 39.9 (41.5)
Inhambane 7.3 7,203 (5.9) -2.5 13.7 (25.0) 59.0 (56.6)
Gaza 7 7,853 (6.5) 13.0 12.8 (23.0) 55.0 (48.8)
Maputo
Provincia
5.4 8,694 (7.2) 97.5 10.7 (22.8) 51.9 (52.4)
Maputo
Cidade
5.9 13,644 (11.2) 29.5 9.8 (30.0) 51.7 (58.0)
Total 100 121,562 (100) 15.8 13.7 (24.3) 48.0 (49.0)
Source: World Bank (1991), unpublished material from Ministry of State Administration and the Ministry
of Planning and Finance, and authors’ estimates.
Health and education services are important for human resource development and civil
service jobs tend to be concentrated there. In Table 2, the shares of civil servants in
health and education in 2000 are compared to those in 1990. Figures indicate that the
number of civil servants in health services decreased markedly in the 1990s, from 24
per cent of the total to only about half that in 2000. While poor data collection could
account for part of the sharp disparity, the general retrenchment in health service
provision during the period could explain the reduction in civil servants in the sector. As
for education, the share of civil servants in the sector has remained relatively unchanged
at about 50 per cent.
Since the success of the reforms being pursued in Mozambique is very dependent on the
ability of the civil service to implement policies and to deliver services, it has been
important to be able to determine the size of the civil service accurately. Only then can
the government put in place effective incentive structures. The government first tried to
account for the number of its employees by devising a structure of grades and salaries in
1990 to which to allocate them (Republic of Mozambique, 1990, 1991, 1992). On the
basis of a Cabinet Decree, an improved payroll system, with a unified and
decompressed salary scale covering the whole of the public sector was also devised. It
defined three career-levels: technical, administrative and clerical. Related to this,
criteria for the staffing needs of the various departments and institutions were also set
up.
However, in spite of the above measures, a clear conceptualisation of the size and role
of the civil service had not been achieved by 2000. This was largely due to the serious7
constraints faced by the new system, especially the failure to introduce incentives on
which the success of the new approach was premised. For examples, although a better
definition of careers was meant to make the service more professional, there was an
inherent partiality for formal levels of education, in a country suffering a serious
shortage of educated individuals. The lags between the various career stages were also
too long, while the terms of reference for the various positions were poorly defined or
missing altogether. Although the new incentive structure was supposed to increase
competitiveness and raise productivity in the civil service, the reverse was often the
case, since high levels of salary compression left little room for income differentiation.
Last, the government, while undertaking stabilisation measures, had little means of
raising wages. Over time, civil service salaries lost their purchasing power, forcing civil
servants to look for other means of survival outside the public sector or to engage in
unlawful activities within the public sector itself.
Other attempts were made between 1997 and 1998 to ameliorate the condition of the
civil servants and to raise morale in the public sector. However, in devising the new
staff salary structure of 1999, there was undue concern for the situation of the senior
administrators, who would now get enhanced packages and other benefits and those at
the technical levels did not see much improvement in their earnings. Thus the new
career and salary structure also failed to address the fundamental issues at the centre of
the poor performance of the public sector. The government needed to approach the
problem holistically and any piecemeal measures directed at only sections of the civil
service, interchangeably those at the bottom of the scale, those with formal education or
those at more senior positions, were bound to fail.
In 1990, the average level of qualification of the civil servants was quite low. Less than
20% of higher-level civil servants had a university degree, while up to 16% had no
formal schooling at all. This lack of human capital was reflected throughout the various
departments of the government. For example only a quarter of 247 chiefs of
departments at the central level had a college degree, similarly only a sixth of 133
provincial directors had a college degree, while only 5 of 199 chiefs of provincial
departments were college graduates. At the district level all the 199 district directors
lacked a college degree. In the ministry of education, only 60 per cent of the over
30,000 elementary/junior high teachers had completed an elementary school education.
(Data from World Bank, 1991)
In 2000, the level of qualification of Mozambican civil servants had improved but not
by much. Those with a university degree corresponded to a mere 6% of the total number
of civil servants, while up to 40% had attained a level of education of only between 1 to
6 years. The number of employees without formal education amounted to 18 per cent.
Since records show that the average length of service for an unskilled civil servant is
almost 20 years, there is serious concern that a culture of low skill and low productivity
has perpetuated the civil service. This also suggests that the human resource
management system within public administration has been relatively weak with few
measures at upgrading skills in the civil service.8
3 Incentive structure in the Mozambican civil service
Privileges and incentives for workers in the civil service and the rest of the government
are incorporated in the General Statute for State Functionaries (Republic of
Mozambique, 1987), while additional commitments are added via special statutes for
particular categories such as teachers (for example the Statute for Teachers). The
General Statute establishes the occupation structure with common functions, as well of
the ladder associated with promotions. It also defines the conditions for entry, the
probationary period, performance and promotions, disciplinary rules, vacations and
related issues, and retirement procedures. It confers equal treatment on both sexes for
similar work and duties in matters of wages, training and holidays. In the case of
women privileges related to childbirth are also specified.
The changes in pay regime in the public sector can be divided into distinctive periods:
From 1975-1985, the government’s main objective was to improve the social welfare of
workers at the lowest levels. This was consistent with the ruling Frelimo’s egalitarian
ethos. In 1975 the ratio between the highest and lowest wages in the public sector was
7.6 (World Bank, 1991). To alleviate shortages at the technical staff level, the
government increased the wages of technical staff. For the following five years,
however, nominal wages remained unchanged, representing in practice a serious
reduction in the purchasing power of civil servants, especially in light of the escalation
of prices in the economy (Republic of Mozambique, 1980).
At the start of economic reforms in 1987, the government attempted to reverse the
serious wage compression that characterized civil services wages. However, the
structural and financial problems that had accumulated during 1975-1985 made drastic
improvements impossible. Beginning with 1991, the government embarked on the
introduction of a system of professional categories ranging, from A to Z, as well as the
harmonization of employee incentives (Republic of Mozambique, 1990, 1991, 1992). In
support of the new changes, a series of decrees from the Council of Ministers were used
to adjust salaries annually until the system came to an end in 1998. On the whole, the
reform had led to a more rapid contraction of civil service wages than was good for the
maintenance of incentives and discipline. While the ratio between the lowest to the
highest wages was 17 in 1991, it had already fallen to only 7.6 by 1995. Though wage
compression has receded by 1998, wage fluctuations in the 1990s were marked, making
the government’s incentive schemes unworkable (World Bank 1991, and yearly decrees
between 1992 and 1998).
In attempting to improve the incentive structure in the civil service, the government
devised new guidelines in 1998 and began to apply them in 1999 (Republic of
Mozambique, 1998a&b). They included measures for the revision of professional
categories, wage decompression and improved recruitment practices to ensure that jobs
are done by qualified individuals. To enhance the skills and competencies of those
already in the system, training schemes were also devised. Last, the government
undertook to decrease the number of cadres at the lower level in line with the
supervisory capacity of the civil service.
To achieve these objectives, the government reclassified the 2000 occupational
categories then existing into 150 general and specialised categories for the areas of
diplomacy, higher education, medicine, auditing and inspection, and education. The
salary scales were indexed for easy reading and revision, while the mechanisms for9
promotion were now to be based on performance and other objective criteria. Further,
more emphasis would be put on the management of human resources within the public
sector. As an indicator of the impact of the new reforms, the ratio between the lowest
and highest wages in the civil service rose to 20.
Let us now discuss the evolution of wages in Mozambique since 1975, using examples
drawn from the earnings of the various professional and skill categories (see Republic
of Mozambique, 1980, 1990, 1991, 1992a&b, 1998a&b, 1999).
Figure 1
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Figure 1 shows changes in real wages for the administrative and professional cadres in
the Mozambican civil service, in this case permanent secretaries, directors in
government departments, as well as specialists with doctorates. Evaluated in 1980s
prices, these categories were reasonably well remunerated in the mid-1970s. However,
the first decade of independence saw a sharp real wage decline, which was complicated
further by the onset of civil war in the early 1980s. It was not until the introduction of
economic reforms in 1987, that the downward slide in real wages was stopped. The
rapid growth of the economy in the 1990s seems to have helped raise wages, although
they remained decidedly below the levels of the mid-1970s. With respect to real wages
in the second half of the 1990s, peace does not seem to have been wage enhancing for
the higher echelons in the civil service. This is in spite the fact that for some groups,
such as specialised medical doctors, nominal wages were topped up by up to 75 per cent
of the basic salary.
For the lower cadres in the civil service, wage fluctuations were not as marked, although
their wages were quite small. For example, while the base salary for high level
professional staff was about US$240 per month, and the average wage in the public
sector about US$120 per month, the lowest cadres received less than US$50 per month.10
In comparison to similar professional categories in the private sector, civil service pay
was quite low. While private companies are free to set their wages, especially after the
liberalization of the 1980s, salaries in the public sector are set administratively, after tri-
partite meetings between the private sector, the unions and the government. A
comparison of salaries in the private sector with those in the civil service shows that in
1990 salaries for management level employees in the private sector were up to 5.6 times
higher than in the civil service (see Table 3). Those for professional staff, including
specialists such as medical doctors, were up to 3.4 times higher. However, the gaps
were largest for the medium-skill categories such as clerical staff and drivers, where
private sector wages are up to ten times higher.
In 2000, the gaps between private and public sector earnings had narrowed somewhat at
the management levels, following a series of adjustments in government pay for top
employees. Still, private sector wages were three times higher than public ones at that
level. At the professional and specialised levels, the gap remained relatively unchanged.
Thus in 2000, a Lecturer at the Eduardo Mondlane University earned about US$300 a
month, a sum, which included a 60% professional bonus. This was close to the salary
earned by drivers in the private sector.
Thus in relative and absolute terms, the system of incentives in the Mozambican public
sector was far from adequate. It would not ensure that the government retained people
with the training and skill necessary to raise productivity in the public sector or to raise
the efficiency with which social services are provided. As in other African countries
lack of financial resources was the most immediate impediment to raising remuneration
in the public sector. Ad hoc measures have been used in the past to rectify the situation.
For example, to retain technical staff, the government had devised in 1989 a monthly
subsidy to them in foreign currency, which was deposited on accounts controlled by the
Ministry of Finance. However, such a scheme proved unworkable in a liberalising
economy. The alternative of undertaking sharp retrenchment in order to ensure that the
remaining officers are paid adequately is still a difficult choice to make, however.
In the health sector regional pay incentives have been created. For example, medical
doctors working in the remoter parts of Niassa or Tete Provinces could command a 120
per cent increase in their base salaries (Republic of Mozambique, 1999). However, this
would still be inadequate if not combined with some other income-generating activity
for the professional or his/her family. The remote regions of the country do not have
these possibilities for extra income generation and thus the government’s salary
differentiation scheme is unable to attract doctors to these regions in sufficient numbers.
Table 3
Ratios of private/public sector wages by category 1990, 2000
1990 2000
Senior Administrator 5.6 3.0
Professional Staff 3.4 3.8
Clerical Staff 10.5 -
Drivers 10.6 -
Unskilled workers 9.5 6.8
Source: World Bank (1991), and unpublished official data11
The inability of the government to retain qualified staff has also affected the
implementation of donor projects and programmes. In individual departments, therefore,
there has been a tendency to resolve staffing problems by creating special arrangements
based on a variety of allowances, creating possibilities for “consultancies” within
projects and thus command better pay or the payment of fees or allowances to
employees attending seminars or important meetings. In other instances, such as in the
line ministries of Health and Agriculture, specialists and managers have simply been
paid directly by donors.
More recently, senior managers in government have been given seats on the boards of
the partly privatised companies, which has improved their earnings but also demands a
considerable amount of their time. Moreover, there is also the risk that now that they are
partly representing the interests of the private sector their allegiance to government
policies might be distorted. Serious principal-agent problems are bound to arise.
Thus although the various interventions to improve incentives have helped to raise
morale among segments of the civil service, the proliferation of wage enhancement
schemes has had a number of negative effects. First, it has encouraged a “seminar
culture”, with meetings taking a considerable portion of the time that civil servants
would have spent on policy implementation. Since senior managers also attend a
considerable number of meetings, decision making tends to be paralysed. This problem
can be especially cumbersome for policymakers in the remoter regions who are
summoned to the capital for meetings. Second, these wage enhancement schemes have
led to the lack of wage harmony in the public sector. Relatively junior officers attached
to donor financed projects could earn many times more than their departmental
superiors. This causes dissatisfaction and even insubordination. Of concern is the
government’s very limited capacity to sanction poor performance or to reward success
as it has little influence on the incentive structure.
4 Institutional reforms and governance issues
To move ahead in its political and economic reforms, Mozambique has had to evolve
new institutions for governance, both at the national and lower levels. This is in broad
terms evidenced by the adoption of multiparty democracy and the introduction of “local
governments” (autarquias). The areas so designated have been allowed a measure of
self-governance. A major goal behind these changes has been to improve the level of
participation of the population in the decisions that affect their lives.
To its credit, the government has recognised that reform of the public sector would be a
long-term process. At the end of the 1990s, it put together a programme, to be
implemented over a period of 10 years, that would address many of the institutional
problems outlined above. The central objectives of the programme include the
modernisation of the public sector; improvement of its ability to formulate and
implement policies, including the efficient use of public resources; decentralisation,
including planning for and deployment of resources; improving systems for human
resource management, including wage structures; improvement of governance, that is
institutional development at both the central and regional levels.12
The program will be divided into phases. The first phase will start in August of 2001
and run up to mid-2004. During this phase, the government hopes to establish the
financial management systems as well as the remuneration and incentive schemes for
the public sector that will be more robust than those attempted in the past. With these in
place, the government will then be in a position to improve the implementation of its
policies, with the help of a better-motivated civil service.
As a first step in implementation, an Inter-ministerial Commission for Reforms in the
Public Sector was created by presidential decree in March 2000 to establish mechanisms
to manage the process. The Commission incorporates line ministries, among others the
ministries of Planning and Finance, Education, Labour, Health and Justice and
Agriculture and Rural Development. A unit to deal with the technical aspects of reform
was also created to assist the Commission in planning, co-ordinating, and monitoring
programs and projects within the reform process. As an indication of the priority given
public sector reform, the Commission is chaired by the Prime Minister and reports to
the Council of Ministers (Republic of Mozambique, 2000c&d).
The government has also sought consultation with the people at various levels. This
could be, for example, via the implementation of sector-wide projects, such as those in
agriculture, health and education, supported by donors, with consultations between
NGOs, the private sector and the beneficiaries thought to be key to project
effectiveness. At the district or regional level, new forms of public management
revolving around the new entities, autarquias, have been established. The goal is to
increase local participation while also bringing services closer to the where they are
needed. However, while this is a promising departure from the relative aloofness of the
past, it is not quite clear how these new entities will raise revenue, nor what specific
activities, as opposed to those of central government, they should focus on. Part of this
confusion of roles is because the legislation setting these new entities is not quite
complete. They still rely almost exclusively on transfers from the state budget, and their
operational independence is thus substantially limited. Weak auditing systems also
imply that the keeping of accounts is irregular. Still, the new administrative forms could
well form the basis for the devolution of power to the lower levels, and evolve
horizontal, as opposed, to vertical planning modes to support the decentralisation
process.
In Nampula, a pilot decentralisation project, which includes almost all the districts
within the province, has been undertaken with good results. Based on this experience
and a previous Rural Development project with the World Bank, and also taking into
account that there is some competition among donors to replicate the Nampula
experience to other provinces of Mozambique, a larger project is now being designed
within the Ministry of Planning and Finance. These types of actions and experiments are
seen as necessary for providing a basis on which solutions to some of the countries
critical problems can be based.
However, as already noted, serious human capacity problems remain, making many of
the reforms difficult to implement. For example, while financial accountability,
budgeting and monitoring are important for the success of the new structures, and to
eradicate corruption, in reality there is very little bookkeeping at the local level,
although current stipulations are that books should be audited twice per year. With a
view to strengthening accountability, the government has embarked on the process of13
drafting a law to govern the use of public finances. However, if the government fails to
undertake these duties, these efforts might fail to improve accountability.
The government has also had to consult broadly with respect to broader national
policies, including macroeconomic policy, judicial reforms, and privatisation. In a
society that has suffered various forms of cleavage in the past, ranging from external
aggression to civil war, this has not been an easy task, however. Parliamentary
democracy is a very recent phenomenon, while political opposition is still viewed with
suspicion in government circles. In the wake of the peace process many new social and
political groupings have emerged, collectively referred to as civil society, expanding
their influence and demands on the government. Domestic and foreign NGOs, and by
extension, the donor community have also had to be incorporated in various ways into
the reform process. In this regard, the biggest challenge has been to establish credible
and democratic institutions that would bridge the sharp social dichotomies, repair the
collapsed economy and stem rising poverty, especially in the remoter regions of the
country.
With regard to interaction with donors, aid management has caused much concern. This
is because of two interrelated reasons. First is the proliferation of aid operations in the
country. Owing to the immense needs of the country, but also its strategic importance in
Southern Africa, Mozambique has attracted a large donor community, and multifaceted
aid programmes. On the host side, up to seven agencies at the national level are
involved in the administration of aid. While the Planning and Budget Directorate of the
Ministry of Planning and Finance is the lead agency in this respect, a number of other
instances are also involved: the Treasury, the Directorate for International Co-operation,
Customs, the Central Bank, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, and the National
Institute of Disasters and Natural Calamities (which registers aid in kind). The donor
agencies, notably the IMF and the World Bank, also register and monitor the volume of
aid inflows. The proliferation of contracts, administrative cultures and interventions
implied by the “aid problem” has detracted the government from implementing its
programmes and delayed the time when the government can claim to be the main force
behind domestic policies (Plank, 1993).
Second, as already noted above, capacity for aid implementation remains weak, with
donors using expatriates to manage their projects, and thus putting the latter’s
sustainability into question (Harrison, 1998). Of most concern is the fact that only a
portion of the aid inflows is registered as budgetary resources. The persistence of “off
budget” resources is partly a result of the unwillingness of donors to lose control over
their “pet” projects, with which they have sometimes been associated for decades and
partly the genuine fear that given management capacity constraints the projects will fail.
However, donors have recently shown a willingness to abandon project aid and instead
provide general budget support. To achieve the effectiveness they desire, donors are
now focusing on how to help the government improve its human resources and
technical competence in budgetary matters in order to ensure a higher degree of
accountability in the use of resources. This would for example reduce corruption in the
civil service, which is acknowledged to be a serious impediment to policy
implementation.14
With regard to the reform of the judiciary, it is clear that after thirteen years of
economic reforms, many aspects of the legal system, including the judiciary and the
courts, are no longer appropriate and must be abandoned. The expansion of the private
sector, especially since the government embarked on privatisation in the early 1990s,
has necessitated improvements in property rights, the creation of mechanisms for
settling business disputes and the formulation of a law of bankruptcy (see Brück,
FitzGerald and Grigsby, 2000). Overall, business disputes need to reach expeditious
foreclosure in order to lower costs and to speed up investment. Moreover, a commercial
code was needed to enable the development of a conducive business environment.
Donors have also insisted that the government should make important improvements in
its judiciary and other legal institutions. As a result, the restructuring of the legal sector
has become an important aspect of the overall economic and political reforms in
Mozambique.
5 Reforms, social sectors and poverty reduction
An overriding goal of the reform process in Mozambique, as indeed in other African
countries, has been poverty eradication. Measurements based on the 1996/1997
Household Survey showed that close to 70 per cent of the population is considered poor.
Moreover, there are some serious regional disparities, with the remoter areas having a
higher poverty incidence than areas closer to the capital (see for example, De Sousa,
Sulemane and Matusse, 1999). Thus in the government’s programme for the period
2000-2004, poverty reduction has become the core goal of economic policy. Based on
the survey named earlier, the first poverty assessment was done in 1998, enabling the
government to embark on strategies for the reduction of absolute poverty, with an
Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA) finalised in December
1999. This document was the basis for the Interim-Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,
which, after endorsement from the IMF and World Bank, made it possible for the
country to accede to the Enhanced HIPC in 2000.
To encourage reform ownership and ensure sustainability, the approach used in the
production of the PARPA has been geared towards capacity building, favouring local
intellectual input and done almost entirely by the staff of the Ministry of Planning and
Finance. The remaining challenges include how to devise consultation that must go in
hand with poverty reduction programmes. Until very recently, the government was poor
at discussing policy issues with the major stakeholders. Thus consultation, given the
requirement that it should relate directly to overall planning and budgeting, will also
become a learning process for the civil service and the government as a whole.
Consultation also helps to keep stakeholder demands and expectations within realisable
limits.
A key element in poverty reduction is the adequate supply of social services, notably
education and healthcare. In November 1977, following independence in 1975, the
Frelimo government had introduced a Health Bill, which had effectively socialised
medical care. However, the civil war had a negative impact on the economy, and there
were few resources to cater for the health and education needs of the population. But
even after a number of years of relative peace, the quality of health service delivery in
public institutions remains questionable, with donor support still important in ensuring
the supply of a modicum of services, especially in the rural areas.15
Table 4 shows that on the whole the health infrastructure in Mozambique remains
rudimentary, with, for example, a total of only 14,000 beds for a population of over 17
million. However, although the earlier socialist experiment had helped spread health
units throughout the country, today many of them lack adequate supplies of medicine
and materials. Many hospitals are in a poor physical state. The supply of doctors and
specialists is much better in Maputo and surrounding regions than in the remoter areas
to the north. Although newly graduated doctors have to spend a period of internship
upcountry, they soon return to the urban areas where the possibilities for augmenting
incomes are much better. In a bid to improve the supply of medical services, the
government introduced special clinics, where patients would be treated at a fee. Fully
private-run clinics were soon introduced as well. While improving services for the more
affluent groups, the new approach has split the loyalties of the medical workers since
they can now earn many times their official wages by working a few days in the private
sector. They do not wish to abandon the public sector all together since they still enjoy
the non-salary benefits attached to public employment. The richer groups have, in
increasing numbers, sought treatment in neighbouring South Africa.
Table 4
Mozambican national health infrastructure by province, 1997 (numbers and %)
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Niassa 5 107 (10) 696 (4.9) 368 (3) 26
Cabo Delgado 8.5 84 (8) 857 (6) 535 (5.2) 32
Nampula 18.9 157 (14.9) 2124 (14.8) 1050 (4.3) 38
Zambezia 19.2 166 (15.7) 1340 (9.4) 802 (3) 38
Tete 7.6 84 (8) 1041 (7.3) 515 (5.2) 31
Manica 6.6 75 (7) 728 (5.1) 453 (5.3) 29
Sofala 8.4 121 (11.5) 1641 (11.5) 847 (5.8) 68
Inhambane 7.3 76 (7.2) 1220 (8.5) 634 (2) 32
Gaza 7 85 (8) 1312 (9.2) 581(4) 23
Maputo
Provincia
5.4 61 (5.8) 921 (6.4) 362 (5.5) 25
Maputo Cidade 5.9 38 (3.6) 2362 (16.5) 1553 (13.7) 49
Total 100 1054 (100) 14305 (100) 7700 (6.2) 391
Source: Min. da Saúde, Informacão Estatística Sumaría, Janeiro-Setembro de 1996.16
To address the shortage of human capital, the government embarked on a strategic plan
for the education sector to cover the period 1999-2003. Its goals include universal
access to primary education, improvement of quality of education, and ensuring that the
system is flexible, decentralised and sustainable. However, like many other reforming
countries in Africa, Mozambique has been confronted by the dilemma of attempting to
improve the quality of social services, especially in education, with little means of
defraying the costs of expanded provision. With the majority of the population
characterised as poor, cost-sharing measures have achieved very little in improving
services. Thus, any expansion in the numbers accessing school without offsetting
increases in expenditure on education has meant declining quality of services. Dropout
rates have also been substantial.
Over the period 1980-86, before the civil war had ruined the economy, the education
budget had comprised 17-19 per cent of the general state budget (OE). In 1987, with the
civil war reaching a higher intensity, the budget fell to below 10 per cent of the state
budget, as service expenditure competed with that of the military. In adjusting to this
shock, wages in the education sector fell in real terms by about 50 per cent, while the
supply of materials was also seriously curtailed. The sector was saved from collapse by
foreign aid, which in total exceeded what the government was spending on education.
Since embarking on the liberalisation of the economy in the late 1980s, Mozambique’s
modern sector has experienced a sharp increase in the overall competition for skilled
manpower. The backlog in training that was caused by the civil war and economic crisis
led to severe skill scarcities across the board. In 1990, for example, the number of
Mozambicans with a university degree was estimated at only 3000, in a total labour
force of almost 6 million. The 1997 Census estimated that this number had increased to
about 8000 people, that is still only about 0.1% of the adult population. The distribution
of those with degrees by residence and occupational category indicates serious regional
disparities, with invariably all degree holders resident in urban areas, which account for
only 30 per cent of the total population.
Three institutions provide higher education in Mozambique and, apart from some
training abroad, are thus the main source of professional and managerial cadres in the
civil service: Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM), Higher Institute of International
Relations and the Pedagogical University, all three offer diplomas, bachelor’s degree as
well as licenciatura. Only the Pedagogical University has educational activities based
outside the capital, Maputo, with branches in Beira and Nampula. In 1994, the three
institutions admitted a total of about 1,200 students, with women accounting for about
26 per cent. Since the mid-1990s, and as a general reflection of the liberalisation trend
in Mozambique, three private colleges have been established: the Catholic University,
with campuses in Beira, Nampula and Cuamba in Niassa Province, a Polytechnic, ISPU,
with campuses in Maputo and Quelimane, and an Institute for Science and Technology,
ISCTEM, in Maputo.17
Table 5
School attendance by province and level, 1997 (student/teacher ratio, %, in brackets).
Region % of total
population
(17.2m)
Grades 1-5 Grades 6-7 Grades 8-10 Grades 11-12
Niassa 5 79,818 (46) 5,735 (27) 1,694 (19) 334 (21)
Cabo Delgado 8.5 121,972 (55) 6,657 (32.5) 2,522 (28) 309 (13)
Nampula 18.9 269,747 (53) 15,143 (33) 4,159 (29.3) 583 (17)
Zambezia 19.2 330,253 (65) 15,628 (40) 3,748 (49) 382 (25.5)
Tete 7.6 124,304 (49) 9,748 (27) 3,124 (36) 341 (19)
Manica 6.6 101,004 (59) 11,136 (47.6) 2,392 (30) 201 (13)
Sofala 8.4 111,179 (56) 12,127 (38) 3,814 (27) 574 (30)
Inhambane 7.3 159,838 (68) 16,567 (47) 3,262 (27) 220 (12)
Gaza 7 173,737 (79) 14,995 (50) 3,940 (42.8) 284 (18)
Maputo
Provincia
5.4 130,344 (83) 14,786 (41) 4,328 (28) 426 (25)
Maputo Cidade 5.9 142,853 (63) 31,960 (41) 12,228 (55) 2,689 (38)
Total 100 1,745,049 (61) 154,482 (39) 45,211 (35) 6,343 (24)
Source: Ministério da Educacão (1997).
Table 5 depicts aspects of the Mozambican dilemma in education. While school
attendance at the lower levels seems to be evenly spread among the provinces, and with
the student /teacher ratios not seriously divergent, attendance rates for the country as a
whole and for the rural provinces in particular fall rapidly after the 5th grade. In 1997,
the country had only about 6000 students in the 11-12th grades, attendance rates that
were much lower than for neighbouring countries. It is obvious that the numbers
currently filtering through the school system are simply too low to provide the level of
human capital that is consistent with sustainable development and poverty reduction.
There is thus a strong case for giving priority to the education sector in subsequent
reforms (Shoeman, 1999).
6 Conclusions
Owing to its history of conflict-ridden colonial rule and post-independence civil war, it
might be tempting to consider Mozambique and the evolution of its state structures as a
special case. However, the challenges related to the reform of its civil service in the
1990s are similar to those in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. First, that it is important for
the government to establish credibility not only with the general population but even
more crucially with employees in the public sector. Civil servants have in the past been18
expected to behave differently from the rest of the population and to continue to provide
services to the population under inadequate conditions of service. Credibility will,
however, not be achieved by the adoption of discretionary measures directed at strategic
elements of government. Higher wages and terms of service for chosen individuals and
groups such as doctors and university teachers can only go so far in enhancing public
sector productivity. Sustainable improvements demand that the government undertake
comprehensive measures that encapsulate the whole of the public sector.
Second, improving incentives in the public sector should not be conceived of as an
isolated exercise, since it is part and parcel of overall economic reform. Very little
improvement in employment conditions in the public service and in the delivery of
social services can be achieved when the rest of the economy remains in disarray. This
is especially true in light of the current efforts at decentralising government functions in
Mozambique, and elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa. Access to social services not only
demands an adequate level of infrastructure, at its most basic, roads, but also stable
macroeconomic conditions.
Third, much of the progress made in public sector reform in Mozambique has been
largely thanks to the goodwill of the donor community and the multilateral institutions.
However, this has also meant that donors have tended to influence the agenda at the
expense of domestic initiative. In the medium to long-term, however, the question of the
ownership of the development agenda will have to be addressed. It is only when policies
are internalised, and the reform thrust is from within, that improvement in the public
sector become sustainable.
Last, engaging in far reaching reforms without sufficient own resources, risks
subordinating the government’s political agenda to that of the donor community. This is
the dilemma facing most African governments. However, given Mozambique’s recent
history of civil war and weather shocks, financial independence will not be achieved in
the near future. Still, efforts at improving capacities in the public sector in general and
civil service in particular could ensure that future reforms will be driven from within.
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